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Against Relativism: 
Restoring Truth in Writing 
BARBARA COUTURE 
In an essay on the relationship between relativism and rhetoric, Barry 
Brummett argues that philosophical relativism is compatible with the prac-
tice of rhetoric. As Brummett tells us, "If truth for relativists is consensus or 
agreement, and if rhetoric is the way in which agreement is secured, then 
relative truth is the product of rhetoric" (91-92). To a relativist like 
Brummett, the ethical purpose of rhetoric is simply "to work" as a tool to 
persuade someone that an idea is consistent or inconsistent with a given 
system of values; it has no inherent purpose to be "always fair, honest, 
decorous" or to serve "dominant ideologies" (90). Brummett suggests that 
rhetoric enables the practice of relativism asa metaphysics, a scienceoftruth-
seeking. He also presumes an altruistic end to the struggle for relative truth 
through the practice of rhetoric. He claims "the rhetorical critic who is 
informed by rela tivism is unavoidably a social critic, charged with demystifying 
perceptions of the given and showing what is both relative and socially, 
symbolically created about them" (93). For Brummett, the critic informed by 
the power of rhetoric and the philosophy of relativism "intervenes not only 
to change how the past was seen but to shape how the future may be 
experienced" (93-94). 
An assumption underlying Brummett's view of the social critic is that the 
critic is "unavoidably" driven to suggest change for the better-what other 
aim would there be "to Change how the past was seen" and thus "shape how 
the future may be experienced," except to improve upon the current situa-
tion? Yet the practice of rhetorical relativism guarantees no reliable 
standard for judging action; it merely provides a tool to distinguish a 
difference between one way of seeing and another, a perception that left 
unguided by some ethical stance could lead either to endless and unresolvable 
bickering over which position holds greater value or to a truth accepted on the 
sole basis of a rhetorical argument which proved most powerful. This vision 
of truth-seeking and rhetoric declares endless agonism and display of rhe-
torical power to be the only means of dealing with the diversity of individual 
practices and values. It is a vision tha t, if accepted, categorically dismisses the 
idea that rhetoric and its practice in writing can lead us to a common truth. 
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And consequently, I would argue, it is a view that divests both written 
argument and literature of their ability to achieve an ethical stance. In this 
essay I set out to restore truth-seeking in writing through extricating writing 
from the philosophy of relativism and its corresponding rhetoric. I shall do 
so by performing a critique of written arguments by two scholars who hold 
that truth and value are relative in both written argument and literature. 
In Plato, Derrida, and Writing, a study of Plato's and Derrida's views on 
writing, rhetoric, and critical theory, Jasper Neel dismisses the relationship 
of truth to writing. He distinguishes truth from writing by claiming that 
writing is strong discourse and strong discourse is not truth but a critical 
strategy; we need not mistake writing for truth and, further, in evaluating 
writing we should not concern ourselves with it. In Contingencies of Value, 
Barbara Herrnstein Smith tackles the problem from the other end; she 
dismisses the notion of truth and reifies value in its stead. She claims that 
truth-as it has been conceived philosophically as an absolute good-is 
nonexistent; what exists is value, which is a function of exchange (that is, 
something is gained in giving value to something else); the reason that 
writing or anything else is valued, therefore, has no relation to truth, but 
rather to what is secured by declaring it has value. Achieving truth is not 
possible; rather, it is possible only to determine what is better or worse in a 
given situation. 
Both Neel and Herrnstein Smith extricate truth from writing and value 
from truth, but in doing so they do not prove either that writing cannot be 
truth or that truth is not possible. Instead, they interpret truth and writing 
in ways that make them necessarily incompatible, a conclusion that is 
justified by philosophical relativism. In presenting a case against their 
claims, I offer first an introduction to the major arguments made by both 
these theorists. I follow with a critique of the positions they share. This 
analysis reveals that their vision of writing and truth is bolstered by three 
questionable premises about the nature of truth in human experience: 
• a historicist interpretation of human will as it is determined by ideology 
• an essentialist interpretation of objective truth 
• a fundamentalist interpretation of human activity as it progresses over time 
In concluding, I suggest ways of looking at truth that can lead us away from 
these perspectives to restore the possibilityoftruth-seeking through writing. 
Neel's Rejection of Truth in Writing 
In Plato, Derrida, and Writing, Neel attempts to create a morally defensible 
role for writing through dignifying the aims of rhetoric while denying that 
writing seeks truth. This stance shapes his effort to redeem writing as it is 
accused of displacing truth in Plato's Phaedrus and of erasing it in Derrida's 
critical theory. Neel argues that questions about meaning in language are 
separate from questions about the essence of human knowledge, being, and 
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behavior-that is, questions about truth in human experience. He claims that 
the obstacle to an effective theory of writing and practice is the philosopher's 
quest for truth, and he sets out to liberate composition studies-badly in need 
of theory with practical implications-from the philosophical aims against 
which Plato and Derrida assess writing. Neel characterizes the pitfalls of 
giving in to a philosophical view of writing, one that measures its relationship 
to truth, thus: 
Writers who give in to Plato in effect cease to be writers and become philosophers on a 
quest that ... requires writers constantly to admit abashedly that they do not know the 
truth. Writers who give in to Derrida become philosophers who never finish unworking 
all those discourses that conceal or remain ignorant of their own written rhetoricity; such 
writers feel obligated always to work backwards in order to show that what would be 
required to begin a discourse is already gone. (203) 
Neel poses a categorical distinction between the aims of rhetoric and 
philosophy and draws the conclusion that to have one is not to have the other. 
At one point in his argument he concedes that this distinction is not a 
necessary or even helpful one, noting that writers who are liberated from 
philosophy "need the Platonic ideal, the notion of the forever-absent truth 
toward which discourse moves" and "at the same time, writers need 
deconstructive strategy to prevent discourse from presenting itself as the 
truth" (203). But having made this concession, Neel chooses to recognize 
neither Plato's nor Derrida's work as philosophical, work that in itself seeks 
truth. In order to discuss Plato's and Derrida's contribution to explaining the 
role of writing in conducting the quest for truth, Neel elects to interpret their 
writing as purely rhetorical, a device for persuading someone to accept a 
position. He thus renders irrelevant the success of their works as attempts to 
seek truth, and, further, he interprets the search for truth in writing as 
fruitless. 
Neel's chosen perspective on the aims of writing is most evident in his 
deconstructive analysis of Phaedrus. Neel asserts that Plato lied in writing 
through making ambiguous the authorship roles of Lysias, Socrates, and 
Plato. As the reader will recall, the claims which are made about writing in 
Phaedrus are conveyed in the speech of Lysias and in the dialogue about it 
conducted by Socrates and Phaedrus-a dialogue conceived and written by 
Plato. Among the many controversial passages in this work is Socrates' 
declaration that "nothing worth serious attention has ever been written in 
prose or verse," which as Neel claims, "effectively excludes writing from the 
highest forms of thinking, understanding, and communicating" (3). In 
deconstructing Phaedrus, Neel exposes Plato's voice which lies behind the 
words of Socrates, Lysias, and Phaedrus. He notes that Plato writes the 
dialogue as if Socrates were living, and in it Socrates directs Phaedrus to carry 
his message to Homer and other philosophers and speech writers who had 
died before Socrates' time. This evidence and other details pointing to 
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historical anachronism and an overtly fictional stance demonstrate that 
"Plato is mounting an effort to destroy time by using writing to kill all the 
voices of the past while at the same time using it to preclude its use in the 
future" (NeeI7). The result is a rereading ofPhaedrus to cohere with current 
rhetorical theory about the unreliable presence of meaning in texts: 
Reread texts do not say the same thing over and over again. As we "begin" to (re)read 
Phaedrus, having finally reached the end where true beginning begins, we can "begin" to 
see the absences through which the text exists and Plato-the most influential writer and 
sophist of all time-is caught stealing writing from us. (24) 
It is with some delight that Neel catches Plato "stealing writing from us" 
through deconstructingPhaedrus, but the discovery is a fairly hollow victory. 
It is surprising that he does not draw this conclusion himself, given that he 
devotes several pages to demonstrating how Derrida fails to deconstruct 
meaning in Phaedrus by revealing "Plato's inability to control the significa-
tion" (197). Neel's claim of having "caught Plato stealing writing from us" 
seems little different from Derrida's conclusion, as Neel interprets it, that 
"Plato cannot simply present the truth in Phaedrus, or anywhere else for that 
matter" (199). Deconstruction as an analytical tool reveals the potential for 
multiplicity of meaning, but cannot support Derrida's contention that truth 
is not found in writing nor N eel's concl us ion that PIa to steals wri ting from us. 
Neel admits, in fact, that he has not proven the latter, yet he chooses not to 
explore the consequences. For example, he notes that Plato's dialogue is 
structured overtly to set up writing as a "corrupt" replacement for dialectical 
speech, but at the same time this structure covertly redeems writing as the 
preferred medium to pursue knowledge: "Structure is what remains behind 
as the trace of the effort to create a place in which knowledge can come to 
know itself and present itself to the world" (38). Then, as if disappointed in 
an interpretation of Plato that celebrates writing as a means of preserving 
knowledge, Neel adds, "I wish I didn't think Plato knew that" (38). To deal 
with Plato's work as the trace of a progressive quest for knowledge would 
require him to interpret Plato's writing as a means through which we might 
seek truth in human experience. He concludes instead, "Plato wants to use 
writing, rhetoric, and sophistry to destroy themselves. What he must leave 
behind to do so, however, is writing" (23). True to his rhetorical stance, Neel 
prefers to cast the fact that Plato leaves writing behind as Plato's mistake 
rather than probable intention, reminding us that Plato held that "truth as a 
possibility depends on the impossibilityoftruth's appearing in writing" (SO). 
Thus, we learn that the goal to seek truth in writing is fruitless. 
Having shown how Plato makes truthful writing an impOSSibility, Neel 
proceeds to show how Derrida makes writing truthfully an impossibility. For 
Derrida, writing is "recursive, repetitious, never finished, never present; in 
short, an eternal differance" (Neel200); hence, anything written is a conceal-
ment of both truth and the continual play of meaning that is writing. Neel 
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attempts to define Derrida's unusual terminology in a way that makes the 
terms represent stages in an argument that reaches a conclusion. He does so 
by showing "what each term 'indicates' about the process of writing, espe-
cially student writing" (142). In nine brief passages, each offering an 
interpretation derived from his extensive reading, Neel defines presence, 
transcendental signijied,the trace ,absence, and five other terms in the Derridean 
lexicon. He concludes that though the terms certainly are different and point 
to different ways of seeing, his definitions read "like a one-note samba, the 
same term defined the same way nine times" (141). In each case, Neel finds 
Derrida's notion of the infinite play of meaning in writing to be a terrifying 
prospect for writing and specifically for writing teachers. He says, for 
example, of Derrida's concept ofthe "transcendental signified" or the idea of 
"meaning without a signifier," 
If Derrida is right, no such transcendental signified exists or could exist outside the 
presence of God. Thus, when we tell our students to pick a thesis or to discover a central 
idea and treat it fully, we merely exacerbate their fears of writing. They believe in self-
presence and the transcendental signified. Though perhaps not consciously, they also 
know all to well that the more they write the less their own presence is self-assured and 
the further the transcendental signified that would pin (or pen) down their meaning in 
absolute clarity slips away. (150) 
This lapse into uncertainty in search of the transcendental signified is an 
undesirable state, Neel claims, because it leaves writers unable to assert 
anything in writing; a representation can never produce the transcendental 
signified, an absolute meaning or truth which Neel assumes is God. The only 
way out ofthis situation of never being able to express an absolute truth, Neel 
claims, is to liberate writing from philosophy-that is, from any concern with 
notions oftruth conceived as absolute but unwritten (Plato), or as written but 
indeterminate (Derrida). The goal that writing should achieve in truth's 
stead is to produce "strong discourse," discourse that withstands "the scru-
tiny of public life" and leads "to a best choice at a given time, in a given place, 
with a given set of circumstances" (Neel 208). 
According to Neel, "any discourse that has been expressed publicly and 
found adherents becomes strong" (208). And strong discourse is what 
creates "critical truth" (209), the only truth available to humans. Critical 
truth is quite simply that view which manages to survive when contested by 
an opposing view. The only other kind of truth, the philosopher's truth, as 
Neel would call it, is unknowable. Hence, writers who seek it "in effect cease 
to be writers and become philosophers on a quest that will never produce any 
inscription at all, a quest that requires writers constantly to admit abashedly 
that they do not know the truth" (203). Neel outlines principles in the 
practice of sophistic rhetoric that guide the practice of "strong discourse," 
among them a firm trust that "language has the power to fabricate what seems 
to be realities and to generate belief' (207). The ''well-trained'' sophist, Neel 
tells us, not only knows "exactly how any decision or action emerged," but 
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also "knows both how to undermine such decisions and actions and how to 
explain their effect on others" (207). Though Neel defends the practice of 
sophistry through strong discourse as a means of developing an ethical self, 
he chooses not to question the ethical value either of knowing how to create 
the illusion of truth through fabricating ''what seems to be" a reality or of 
aiming to know "exactly" how a "decision or action" emerges in order to 
"undermine" it. The objective of strong discourse, as Neel defines it, is to 
create the illusion of obtaining truth through developing a good argument. 
This strategy amounts to conceding that writing expresses a kind offake truth 
always already positioned for an imminent takeover by yet another fake truth 
which is forever never the truth. Truth, the thing one is after in the first place, 
remains unattainable after all, with writing left over to compensate for its 
loss. But, as I hope to show, we need not accept Neel's compromise because 
we can show him to have misconstrued truth as unattainable in human 
experience. 
The clue to Neel's singular perception oftruth in human experience lies 
in his reported classroom experience of guiding students away from truth-
seeking in writing. Neel reports the frustrations of a female student faced 
with writing a "balanced" essay on the topic of abortion. Her trouble is that 
she already has a truth she believes about the subject: "abortion is wrong and 
oughtn't to be allowed" (93). Neel claims that Plato's theory of dialectic as 
working toward an unattainable truth leaves this student unable to write her 
truth, even though it has an existence, unless she resorts to what Neel calls 
"antiwriting" (93). The latter results in an essay in the required argumenta-
tive form expected by the teacher. He experiences a similar struggle with a 
''young man planning to become a minister" (93) who was writing essays for 
an honors composition class. When reading the text of Job for the first time 
as an assignment for Neel's class, the young man found he could not make 
sense ofit; the text simply did not jibe with sermons he had heard about it in 
the past. Neel reports that he had several conferences with the student who 
wrote several essays on Job, each of which "undid" the other (94). 
Neel admits that he wished to force both this student and the female 
opponent of abortion "to contemplate"when he assigned them writing tasks 
which forced them to confront their accepted values-values with which they 
felt secure and adequate. In each case, the purpose of the classroom writing 
experience was "to change from the simplistic, fundamentalist 'delusion' of 
adequacy to the self-dialectical, contemplative, (p)sophisticated [Neel's 
term for Plato's version of dialectic] 'reality' of inadequacy" (95). This 
approach is wrong, Neel concludes, since it leaves the students feeling as if 
they have failed and the teacherwithou t acceptable student essays. To escape 
the trap of condemning students to inadequacy, Neel concludes, one must 
give up the idea that writing seeks truth. 
It seems to me that Neel's students had difficulties precisely because they 
already had given up the idea that writing seeks truth. Both students opted 
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to deny truth-seeking by writing essays that, as Neel himself describes, could 
be refuted categorically as not true or "that did not pretend to truth" (95). 
Neither understood how to convey truth-seeking in writing, which is not to 
believe that writing is truth nor to deny writing's possible truth, but it is rather 
to understand how writing and writer can grow toward truth; it is to examine 
truth through writing as a dynamic, organic, and developmental component 
of human experience itself. Neel's approach to both students was, by his own 
admission, to force them "into a Platonic frame of reference" (95) that 
required them to search for unattainable truth in writing about topics that 
they were not ready to investigate that way. At the same time, the students 
thought they were supposed to write traditional essays which Neel claims he 
did not expect. But, in fact, a traditional essay is what he did expect or wanted 
to believe he could expect from having students engage in truth-seeking 
through writing. As he admits, every time the student who aimed to be a 
minister gave him an essay, he "gave him an A and then took the essay apart, 
showing him in detail why it was not 'true'" (95). Unable to locate a presence 
of truth either in the student's didactic declarations of belief, nor in his own 
denial ofthose declarations, Neel is forced to conclude that a search for truth 
has no truck with writing. And it is no wonder that his classroom experiments 
with dialectic lead him to this conclusion. 
In an illuminating essay on Plato's Gorgias, James L. Kastely remarks 
that scholars, such as Neel, have repeatedly misunderstood the notion of 
dialectic as it is presented in Plato's writing. Although his remarks specifi-
cally address scholarly readings of Gorgias, they apply to Neel's reading of 
Phaedrus as well. Kastely concludes that the outrageous arguments pre-
sented by Socrates in Gorgias force us "to question Socrates, Plato, and 
ourselves" (107). This condition of "questioning," he finds, is highly relevant 
to the situation of dialectic. A misunderstanding of the role of questioning, 
I believe, informs Neel's distaste for dialectic as a rhetoric for writing. Kastely 
explains the role of the teacher in facilitating dialectic like this: 
Being a teacher can no longer be read as a professional role that one assumes; rather, it 
marks one of two positions in the dialectic. To teach is to question .... To fulfill one's 
position as a teacher is to practice philosophy as rhetoric-to understand the particular-
ity of the other member of the refutation (that is, to recognize the historical, passionate, 
and rational elements of the other person as they have been brought together to 
constitute an individuality), to be sensitive to the language and the commitments 
informing that particularity, and to induce reflection on the language lived with and by 
the other individual. (107) 
Neel felt uncomfortable with the role of teacher imposed upon him by the 
dynamic of dialectic, perhaps because he understood that role as one of 
counterattack and not as one that required him "to be sensitive to the 
language and the commitments informing that particularity" that marked 
the other in his confrontation. To do so, would require some slippage on his 
part, some uncertainty, some uncomfortableness, some letting go of the 
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strangle hold he longs to keep on his truth. It would require him to practice 
"philosophy as rhetoric," as Kastely tells us, rather than practice rhetoric 
(that is, his version of agonistic rhetoric) as philosophy. 
To seek truth must involve an open admission of uncertainty about what 
to believe; the alternative is to stick with what we already know or exchange 
that for a new belief. Neel's students chose the former alternative and would 
do so again if confronted with his version of dialectic. A truth beyond what 
they knew was simply unattainable because to obtain it they were forced to 
give up values that they are not willing to surrender to an attack or to 
substitute for another truth, one more acceptable to the teacher. The 
collusion of rhetoric with philosophical relativism puts the students in this 
predicament, leaving them powerless to discuss in writing the issues and 
beliefs most meaningful to them. To do so would be to put their beliefs at risk 
of being labeled merely an idiosyncratic representation of the truth-a 
judgment relativists levy on every human claim to a philosophical principle. 
This homage to relativism renders human judgment about matters of value 
essentially irrelevant. As I show later, through questioning the stability of the 
premises which underlie Nee!'s argument, rhetoric can be disentangled from 
philosophical relativism, writing can be freed from the limitations of strong 
discourse, and we can assume again moral responsibility for the truth of our 
discourse. 
Herrnstein Smith's Rejection of Truth in Human Experience 
In Contingencies of Value, a critique of the notions of truth and value in art 
and life, Barbara Herrnstein Smith attempts to prove not only that truth is 
contingent on local criteria which we protect from surrender (whether these 
be criteria for a well-formed argument, political action, or moral behavior), 
but also that truth without contingency-that illusive unattainable truth of 
Plato's speculation-does not exist. For Herrnstein Smith, contingent truth 
is a reality we can and must live with because it is all there is. Unlike Neel, 
Herrnstein Smith does not deal with how truth-seeking remains separate 
from writing, art, or any other human enterprise. Instead, she tries to explain 
how we came to believe that what we value is truth, separating this truth from 
objective truth which simply doesn't exist. Herrnstein Smith demonstrates 
tha t val ue is radically con tingen ton cri teria which are supported socially, and 
she argues, as well, that so must be truth. She claims that since I am different 
from you and always will be, what you value must be different from what I 
value and always will be-"value is radically contingent" (30). By extension, 
truth, which is after all what we believe to be behind value, is radically 
contingent. In effect, Herrnstein Smith does not attempt to explain truth or 
value but rather illustrates how our diverse claims about what we value in art, 
writing, politics, or religion ultimately become separate truths which can 
never be enfolded by one truth. 
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In the initial stages of her argument, Herrnstein Smith tackles the 
question of what really happens when a work of art or literature is declared 
to have aesthetic value, that is, judged to be superior aside from "all other 
nameable sources of interest or forms of value-hedonic, practical, senti-
mental, ornamental, historical, ideological, and so forth" (33). She deftly 
illustrates that aesthetic value is seen to be non-contingent or devoid of any 
economic utility simply because judgments in value "appear to reduce to 
differences in the 'properties' or 'qualities' of the Objects themselves" (39-
40), an illusion which is maintained when members of a community are in 
strong agreement. Herrnstein Smith explains this occurrence like this: 
A co-incidence of contingencies among individual subjects who interact as members of 
the same communitywill operate for them as noncontingency and be interpreted by them 
accordingly. (40; emphasis omitted) 
Hence, what is a contingent value quickly becomes seen as an objective value. 
In a chapter on axiologic logic or the logic of philosophical judgments of 
value, Herrnstein Smith goes on to explain how contingent value becomes 
conflated with objective truth. Here she examines "Hume's Natural Stan-
dard" and "Kant's Pure Judgments" and concludes that logic about matters 
of value inevitably comes down to contesting one person's authority over 
another's. To concede a change in value would require someone to give up 
authority. To declare a consensus about value is to assume that consensus is 
good for everyone. She believes that "an ideally achievable consensus is not 
only not good for everyone but tends inevitably to operate to the advantage 
of the majority and those with de facto social power and to the disadvantage 
of the more 'different,' 'idiosyncratic,' 'singular,' and otherwise innovative 
and/or marginal members of any community" (72). The axiologic project, 
then, even in its most democratic guise, always has "the contested legitimacy 
of someone's evaluative authority" at stake: 
Though not all the battles are fought out in drawingrooms or classrooms, they are 
inevitably fought out in social arenas and along lines of authority and power defined by 
social, institutional, and economic categories: age and gender, class and political status, 
teacher versus student, censor versus citizen, bureaucrat versus artist, and producer 
versus art distributor versus art consumer, and so forth. (72) 
Battles about value shall continue for two reasons: first, because value is 
radically contingent, the theme which Herrnstein Smith repeats continually 
and demonstrates in every conceivable manner; and second, because there is 
in the end no objective truth to which any value has a claim. 
In short, all evaluations of all kinds are contingent, including moral 
jUdgments. No evaluations operate autonomously, that is, bereft of any 
influence from the conditions in which they are produced. As Herrnstein 
Smith explains, 
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Expressions such as "It is right," It is good," "Murder is wrong," and "Business is 
business" cannot embody objectivist appeals in spite o/how they are being used because, 
aside from how they are being used, there is no way for them to embody anything at all. 
(89-90) 
The essential good or truth of such claims is often based on their acceptance 
as a norm and the resulting benefits to a community; as Herrnstein Smith 
points out, it is often believed that "a community prospers ... in proportion 
to the extent that its members have achieved consensus or that it prospers 
more as communal norms become more uniform, coherent, and stable" (93). 
However, the opposite is also sometimes believed; that is, communities 
prosper to "the extent of the diversity of the beliefs and practices of its 
members and thus their communal resourcefulness, and the flexibility of its 
norms and patterns and thus their responsiveness to changing and emerging 
circumstances" (93). Hence, Herrnstein Smith concludes that values and 
truths, for that matter, are pretty much a relative thing; there is no bottom 
line, no ultimate truth. The fact of this matter, indeed, is quite inescapable 
and oppressive, as can be assessed from the tone of Herrnstein Smith's 
concluding argument: 
There is thus no particular single dimension or global parameter, whether "biological"/ 
"material" or "cultural"/"spiritual"/"psychological," with respect to which entities can 
be tagged or tallied as, "in the last analysis," good or bad-profit or cost, reward or 
punishment, pleasure or pain-for any subject or set of SUbjects, much less for man in 
general. There is thus also no way for individual or collective choices, practices, 
activities, or acts, "economic" or otherwise, to be ultimately summed-up, compared, and 
evaluated: neither by the single-parameter hedonic calculus of classic utilitarianism, nor 
by the most elaborate multiple-parameter formulas of contemporary mathematical 
economics, nor by any mere inversion or presumptive transcendence of either. There is 
no way to give a reckoning that is simultaneously total and final. There is no Judgment 
Day. There is no bottom bottom line anywhere, for anyone or for "man." (149) 
If the "bottom line" isn't, if there is no supreme value and no uncompromis-
ing truth, what is there? Well, what there is is our own personal standard of 
truth which we establish according to criteria that, again, are personal and 
have personal value. Truth is relative and relativism cannot "deduce or 
demonstrate its own rightness" (183). Instead, relativism "recognizes ... that 
'the way' will be perceived and pursued differently by each to whom it is 
pointed out" (183). 
Having accepted relativism as the natural state of things, we also have 
accepted that value and truth are in constant flux and multiply various. 
Forevermore, we must conceive of the "irreducibly various as irreducibly 
various, and of the multiply configurable as always configurable otherwise" 
(183). What keeps things in this state of constant flux is the fact that value 
and truth are always relative to the conditions ofthe moment which affect the 
cost at which they are purchased; things always change into something else 
because we perpetuate an endless system of "(ex)change" (144), where, as 
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Herrnstein Smith suggests, one good is purchased at the cost of another. 
Hence, all human activity, including the desire to locate a value or declare a 
truth, consists of "a continuous exchange or expenditure (whether as pay-
ment, donation, sacrifice, loss, or destruction) of goods of some (but any) 
kind, whereby goods of some other (but, again, any) kind are secured, 
enhanced, or produced" (144). She interprets truth as a real-world commod-
ity constructed by individuals and groups and bought, paid for, and traded as 
a way of maintaining integrity and authority. 
In support of her relativistic philosophy, Herrnstein Smith creates a 
Weltanschauung that is compatible with events as she has personallyexperi-
enced them. She dismisses absolute truth and in the process resolves a 
personal dilemma, a crisis of seeming inconsistency in her own action which 
acknowledged her own diversity: she found that she had changed her mind 
about something she had thought true in the past and had to justify why. 
Herrnstein Smith opens her discussion of value with a recollection of this 
personal dilemma, an account of her changed perception of the value of 
Shakespeare's Sonnet 116. Reporting the history of her judgment of Sonnet 
116, she claims, 
For a long time, I didn't much like it at all. As a discriminating young snob, I was 
predisposed to find the value of any poem inversely proportional to the frequency of its 
appearance in anthologies .... So it stood until several years ago, when I was immersed 
in teaching the plays, editing the poems and rereading the critics, and immersed also in 
my own life and a second marriage-of true minds, of course, or maybe ... or maybe not. 
And, at that point, I discovered an altogether different 116 .... To be sure, the arguments 
are frail and the sentiments false and strained: but this is nonetheless a powerful sonnet 
because, among other things, that very frailty and strain and falseness are expressive of 
what is strong and true, namely the impulse not to know, not to acknowledge, not to 
"admit" what one does know and would wish to be otherwise. (6-7) 
Herrnstein Smith creates a philosophy of value that allows her to reconcile 
what appear to be incompatibly diverse evaluations, each believed with 
sincerity by herself, and one replacing the other. She concludes her personal 
parable with this assessment of her new evaluation of Sonnet 116: "A lovely 
reading of the poem, I think ... when I believe it" (7). This personal tale 
rationalizes Herrnstein Smith's assessment of value in two ways. First, it 
defines value as a position, a stance, a reading at a point in time which has a 
life or substantiality of its own that does not change. A value experienced at 
a point in time shall forever differ uncompromisingly from some other value 
for which it is eXChanged at some other point in time. Second, it defines value 
as something that is true or not true, present or not present, advocated or 
denied. 
There is nothing in Herrnstein Smith's conception of value which 
suggests that value is developmental, evolutionary, or even accumulative. 
The possibility of viewing valuation as a continuing process instead of 
reifying the separate moments in which value is exchanged is never explored 
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overtly by Herrnstein Smith. Admittedly, she does narrate a series of events 
in her own process of evaluating Sonnet 116, but she does not see these parts 
as they contribute to a seamless whole. Herrnstein Smith chooses not to 
acknowledge that she incorporated her earlier pejorative assessment of 
Sonnet 116 in her later belief that its "frail" and "false" arguments serve 
admirably to express the difficulty of being straightforward about what one 
knows, the important meaning which she claims to have found anewwhen she 
reevaluated Sonnet 116 in her later years. Her more recent judgment did not 
wipe out or change her earlier belief: it subsumed it, incorporated it, 
expanded it, and even blessed it; the seemingly diverse claims grew into one 
complex evaluation. Yet the model Herrnstein Smith proposes to explain 
these events does not account for them as a narrative of growth. It is the 
choice not to view evaluation as a process that leads Herrnstein Smith to see 
value and truth as local, contingent, locked into the framework of time and 
place. It is what leads her to declare that diversity obviates truth and 
contingency displaces universality. 
Contingencies of Denial 
To deny that anything but relative truth can be found in human experience 
(as does Herrnstein Smith) and consequently that anything but relative truth 
can be obtained through writing (as does Neel) is to deny the organic, 
developmental, and evolutionary nature of all human activity. It is to 
conclude that all human activity, including truth-seeking and writing, is 
meaningful only in its singular moments, a conclusion that makes life akin to 
a chess game in which one piece is continually poised to wipe out or replace 
another in the next move. This is a very old and seductive idea; it is derived 
from a limiting belief in three epistemological perspectives: ideological 
historicism, essentialist objectivity, and temporal fundamentalism. In the 
sections that follow, I examine Herrnstein Smith's argument that truth is 
contingent and Neel's assertion that truth in writing is unattainable as they 
are determined by these perspectives. 
Ideological historicism 
Both Neel and Herrnstein Smith hold deterministic views of history as it 
determines ideology. This ideological historicism leads them to predict with 
absolute certainty the future course of human activities and stalwartly to 
deny other possibilities. For Neel, historicism refutes the power of the polis; 
the hope of arriving at truth through discussion among citizens of the world 
is virtually impossible. History demonstrates we have not arrived at truth 
through argument in the past, and hence we cannot do so in the future. For 
Herrnstein Smith, historicism supports and refutes her central thesis that 
people and values are multiply various and ever-changing; in a world histori-
cally determined, variety may be sustained, but change is an illusion, as it but 
marks the return to something prefigured by the past. For both of these 
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critics, historicism is an ideological prerogative which corroborates their 
denial of human growth. 
Neel'shistoricismisdisguisedbyhiscontinuoustalkofdismantlingwhat 
is fixed, of replacing supplements with supplements, old beliefs with new 
beliefs, argument with counter arguments. Such talk apes the continual 
movement of narrative and suggests an unpredictable future that overshad-
ows the past. Neel even advocates narrative, the continual unfolding of 
events ever new, as a credible alternative to the ideology of religious funda-
mentalism that marked his personal past. As he admits when telling of the 
personal conflicts experienced by a student from a fundamentalist back-
ground who had trouble writing about these beliefs, Neel wanted the student 
"to dismantle a world view from which I myself had 'escaped'" (95). But in 
fact, Neel himself has not escaped from a world view which insists on a 
prefigured future. Even in attempting to describe how Derrida's vision of the 
apocalypse differs from that of his Southern Baptist tradition, Neel holds on 
to the notion of a prefigured event moving toward a predetermined end. 
Here is how he describes the apocalypse as explained in the religion of his 
childhood: 
This whole scenario is logocentric because in it Christ constitutes a beginning, an ending, 
an absolute authority, and an origin of meaning. When Christ speaks, at least in the 
Southern Baptist theology of my childhood, he speaks absolute meaning. In effect, what 
he says goes-no equivocation, no ambiguity, no margin for error. In that scenario, the 
trumpet on the last day needs no interpretation. (102) 
In the fundamentalist interpretation of spiritual truth, the meaning was clear 
in the beginning and remains clear in the end-nothing changes. 
In describing how Derrida counters the foundationalist belief in the 
certainty of meaning, Neel sticks to the same historicist perspective. Instead 
ofthe Word which had a meaning at the beginning which will remain the same 
at the end, there ''will always be the play of signification, as signifier refers to 
signifier in an endless chain that never leads back to an origin" (103). Neel 
consciously poses Derrida's vision of the endless "play of signification" as an 
"apocalyptic" vision of another sort (103). Instead of fundamentalist belief 
in an absol ute end dispatched by an eternal God, we now have decons tructionis t 
belief in endless ends determined through eternal agon. Being uncomfort-
able with the ethical paucity of this perspective, he concludes that there is 
purposefulness within this destiny of eternal contest. It is to express and 
discern sophistic truth through the practice of strong discourse. The virtue 
of strong discourse is its distinction as the loudest voice heard "in a cacophO-
nous plurality of other voices, many of which are also strong" (208-09). The 
messianic vision of the fundamentalist is portrayed as false truth to be 
overcome in this new vision of the apocalypse. For Neel, the false messiah 
is the presence of a truth that silences other voices; this ''weak discourse ... 
always presen ts itself in the guise of the messiah or the philosopher -king-the 
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one who claims to offer truth but in fact supplies only the silence that must 
occur when rhetoric, persuasion, writing, and sophistry, those most human 
of things, have been precluded" (209). So, the possibility of a truth for Neel 
shatters the possibility of rhetoric, and the possibility of rhetoric shatters the 
truth. An apocalypse-historically determined-is at hand in either case. 
Herrnstein Smith's historicism is also conditioned by belief. For her, 
history of social class, family relationships, religious persuasion, and aes-
thetic training determine the future, endlessly maintaining diverse and 
equally valid human perspectives. Her fierce individualism and egalitarian-
ism drive this conclusion. Unwilling to believe that a single, final authority 
born of human will resides with some one or some group and no one else 
(individualism), she believes that multiple authorities determine history for 
everyone (egalitarianism). There is no subject who wills absolutely for 
Herrnstein Smith, because to recognize a subject who wills absolutely she 
must recognize a subject to whom she might be subject. 
Within the thralldom of history, Herrnstein Smith has no human con-
tender. Though she rigorously argues that in a relativistic state of affairs 
there is a subject who freely chooses, the facts of history that constrain that 
choice are not free and are not unique, a condition which effectively negates 
the possibility of free choice and an individual subjectivity. For Herrnstein 
Smith, the subject may have a ''particular ... identity/economy/perspective," 
but this "individuated" state is "not in all respects unique" (175). For 
Herrnstein Smith, there can be no transcendental objective reason that 
justifies one subject's choices and "no other subject's choices" (178). Yet, the 
individual'S choices are underwritten by something and if that something is 
"not transcendental, then it must be historical, and if the justification is not 
universal and unconditioned, then it must be restricted, partial, and local" 
(175). In other words, conditions as they were, have been, and are right now 
determine the things that will be, and they determine an individual's choice; 
there is no choice without the conditioning of history and hence no truth 
beyond what is already known. 
Ideological historicism excludes the possibility of human will. It dis-
counts the originary power of the human subject and hence the hope of the 
subject attaining truth through lived experience. As Karl Popper maintains 
in his critique of the role of the polis in an open society, historicism 
obliterates responsibility for action in society. Plato's historicism bound him 
to the view that "social change was degeneration" (Popper 16). In positing 
the past existence of a perfect form of government, society, law and other 
social systems manifested on earth of which such systems in the current world 
are a degenera te copy, PIa to ul tima tely had to concl ude tha t change must halt 
in order to prevent further degeneration. This belief in a disembodied 
perfection in an irretrievable past makes human alteration of this ideal a 
corruption to be stopped at all cost. A similar condemnation of human 
activity results from the Marxist project, which Popper characterizes as a 
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social science initiative driven by historicism. Popper holds that the social 
science perspective fosters a kind of "methodological essentialism" (26). 
The method by which one determines a social truth is to determine the nature 
of what is to come based upon how one has named or interpreted events in 
the past. If revolution in the past is named to have come about because of 
class struggle, then this identified principle will determine the nature of 
revolutions to come. Far from viewing truth as open or even shaped by 
human will, the historicist perspective closes truth and takes it out of the 
realm of human action. 
Both Neel's and Herrnstein Smith's characterizations of truth corrobo-
rate the historicist perspective. For Neel, we who always already do not know 
the truth will never forever find tru tho For Herrns tein Smi th, we who are pre-
conditioned by history, economy, and social identity cannot discover any-
thing, let alone truth, that goes beyond that conditioning. Both the ever-
changing "cri tical truth" which N eel claims to come abou t through con tin ual 
questioning in writing and that ever-changing "relative" truth which 
Herrnstein Smith claims guides our everyday behavior represent expected 
fluctuations in a predetermined world of continual replacement ad infinitum 
of "truths" by other "truths" -all historically determined. If truth has not 
been manifested in the past or present, as they claim it has not, then it is 
certainly unattainable. 
Essentialist Objectivity 
Both Neel and Herrnstein Smith conceive of truth as an object. For Neel, a 
tendency to objectify truth surfaces most strongly in his argument that 
sophistic rhetoric ought to replace Plato's favored method of argumentation, 
dialectic. The italicized words in the passages from Neel's argument shown 
below, for example, uncover his assumption that truth is an entity, an object 
which Plato would have us believe cannot be acquired: 
In this history [of Western thought rejecting sophistry], the True, the Beautiful, and the 
Good come under bitter attack by the sophists, who believe, or at least dupe their 
students into believing, that the True doesn't exist, and if it did no one could know it, and 
if anyone knew it, what the other person knew would be incommunicable. (205-06; 
emphasis added) 
If permanent (or divine) truth exists, humans by definition cannot know it, nor can any 
of their systems of communication convey it . ... (206; emphasis added) 
Strong discourse, in short, encompasses Plato's dialectic by putting all received notions 
in question and then seeking constantly for a better truth . ... (209; emphasis added) 
In fact, he strongly opposes the possibility of conceiving of truth as anything 
else but an object, stating that if truth is not an object, it is but an "opening"; 
to attempt to find it in writing is indeed hopeless: 
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By "taking" Phaedrus as the source of the possibility of truth, not the closure of truth, ... 
the writer can open the possibility of dialectic within the writer's own self. Rather than 
a place or a destination, rather than the shelter of some closed and complete revelation, 
truth becomes an opening. Any writers who agree to enter Platonic writing will find 
themselves injust such an opening; thus, most struggle with all their might never to go 
there. (82) 
The only alternative to jumping into the "opening" which Neel projects as 
Plato's "truth" is to write as a "psophist," Neers term for those who "present 
any position [one chooses] as the closure of truth" (81). This unfavorable 
alternative, which Neel attributes to Plato, is not noticeably distinguishable 
from the "sophistry" Neel advocates in the practice of strong discourse. The 
latter is more worthy presumably because it stands the test of public scrutiny, 
the acumen of which-if we are to believe Barbara Herrnstein Smith-is of 
relative value. 
Neers belief that Plato's truth lacks the objective presence that Neel 
longs for it to have is apparent in his analysis of a portion of Ph a edru s in which 
Socrates speaks about truth, beauty and moral value; here's the text with 
Neers highlighted phrases: 
Lucidity and finality and serious importance are to be found only in words spoken by way 
of instruction or, to use a truer phrase, written on the soul of the hearer to enable him to 
learn about the right, the beautiful, and thegood; finally to realize that such spoken truths 
are to be reckoned a man's legitimate sons, primarily if they originate within himself, but 
to a secondary degree if what we may call their children and kindred come to birth, as they 
should, in the minds of others-believe this, I say, and to let all else go is to be the sort of 
man, Phaedrus, that you and I might well pray that we may both become. 
(qtd. in Neel88-89) 
Neel objects to this text because "the whole paragraph presents itself as an 
emptiness waiting to be filled through the process of dialectic" (89), and, 
further, the words he italicized-in fact, all nouns, verbs, and modifiers in the 
passage-hide "an unending series of questions, uncertainties, replace-
ments, deferrals, differences, and supplements" (89). He complains about 
the uncertain meaning of words in themselves, apart from the context of the 
narrative they develop. To define those italicized words, Neel says, would 
open "an unclosable dialectic" (89). This activity somehow seems unnatural 
and heinous to Neel, as well it should. It is certainly not how we go about 
interpreting communication in our daily lives. 
If we reject Neers tendency to treat the words of Socrates' speech as 
separate objects, we see that the story told here is not equivocal, uncertain, 
or deferential in anyway. Truth surely is not presented as an object, but just 
as surely, it is not presented as an openingorvoid. Socrates'taleofhowtruth 
about the right, the beautiful, and the good gets made is rooted in the very 
concrete material of human flesh and the factual event of human growth. 
Truth is born with man, learned by way of instruction, is passed on to others, 
and grows in them as well in a continuous cycle of birth, growth, and 
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regeneration: an endless, yet constructive, narrative. What could be more 
common to human experience than this familiar progression? What could 
be more certain then birth, growth, and regeneration? More substantial than 
the reality of progress through learning? Neel's truth consists of continual 
replacements and deferrals, whereas the truth Plato reveres is embodied in 
the process ofliving and, being so, is as material and vital as the body of man. 
Neel's truth-which he believes to be Plato's truth-is an abstract and 
motionless entity, a mathematical place holder waiting to find its real object 
or substitute. It remains the same, never changes, and never progresses. It 
is an object never forever to be touched by man, yet always already to be 
replaced by him. 
Herrnstein Smith's objectification of truth is similar to Neel's, yet it is 
motivated by her attachment to an economic model of value. For her, truth 
is a good on the open market, subject to free exchange. This analogy forces 
her to misconstrue the exchange of goods itself as the ultimate function of 
human existence, obviating activity motivated either by self-conscious will or 
disinterested altruism. A "good" -such as truth, for example-resists analy-
sis and hence is affirmed only by what other good can be exchanged for it. 
Herrnstein Smith describes the exchange of goods that establishes what we 
value as follows: 
Goods, either one by one or collectively (as in "the good"), are not reducible to anything 
else in particular, such as pleasure, the enhancement of survival, or the promotion of 
communal welfare .... The irreducibility is a function not of objective qualities but, 
rather, of West em (perhaps human) thought and language within which "good" or some 
counterpart term or set of terms [such as truth, we might surmise] operates conceptually 
and discursively as a generalized positivity that can be locally specified but not further 
analyzed: in other words, (one) "good" can only be exchanged for (an)other good, in 
discourse and otherwise. (146) 
Though Herrnstein Smith claims that the exchange of commodity for com-
modity in the search for value may be necessitated by limitations oflanguage, 
she also suggests that in some essential way the exchange of good for good 
simply defines all activity in human experience. 
An exchange of good for good even explains altruistic behavior, accord-
ing to Herrnstein Smith. To prove it, she argues against Bataille's attempt to 
demonstrate that humans in some circumstances will pursue an "irresistible 
impulse to reject material or moral goods that it would have been possible to 
utilize rationally (in conformity with the balancing of accounts)" (Bataille, 
qtd. in Herrnstein Smith 143). As she interprets Bataille, man's seeming 
altruism is motivated economically because he willingly suffers loss or 
degradation in exchange for an "ultimate value" (144) which is "the unlimited 
exhibition of his irreducibly sovereign free will, his insubordinate subordina-
tion of matter to spirit, and thereby his uniquely and definitively human 
transcendence" (144). In other words, man will suffer loss and degradation 
to help others in eXChange for retaining the beliefthat humans are superior 
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beings with the freedom to choose. Confident that altruism too is accounted 
for in her system of exchange oftruth for value, Herrnstein Smith lapses into 
absolutism, declaring that to conceive of all good in terms of exchange is not 
only a Western phenomenon, but also "perhaps human" (146). 
But her economic model is overly elegant; her singular motivating 
metaphor of profit and loss assumes an economy that is driven by the 
arithmetic of balancing accounts, an economic model whose simplicity 
denies the realities of economic development in present-day society. The 
words investment and growth appear nowhere in Herrnstein Smith's counter-
attack on critiques of utilitarian theories of value, yet they are central to most 
modern economic theories. If Herrnstein Smith were to account for invest-
ment and growth in her model of value ascription, it would be difficult, ifnot 
impossible, for her to limit her discussion to the simple arithmetic of trading 
tit for tat, apples for oranges, value for truth. She instead would have to 
examine truth and value not as goods, but rather as dynamic investment 
processes in an all-embracing system with potential for growth-a system as 
complex and organic as the human race itself. 
In sum, both Neel's and Herrnstein Smith's characterization of truth as 
an object to be continually replaced or exchanged is evidence of their 
essentialist objectivity. As D.W. Hamlyn has explained this view in Meta-
physics, a belief in objects or substances is necessary "to sustain our ordinary 
talk of and belief in change and the identity over time which is the correlate 
of change" (66). Yet an essentialist vision of truth as object cannot be 
confirmed by empirical or other evidence. Nor can objective presence be 
assumed for any other thing that we identify as a substance. As Hamlyn notes, 
"philosophers who have [considered that] scientific views of the world give 
plausibility to the belief that the best terms in which to speak and think ofthe 
world are not those of substance, identity and change, but, for example, 
events or processes" (66-67). Neel and Herrnstein Smith limit their discus-
sion oftruth to the assumption of truth as an objective presence. To disprove 
the presence of truth in human evaluation or in writing, they both demon-
strate that it is not an Object to be found. It could be argued that their 
essentialist rhetoric does not lead them to conclude objectivity is a meta-
physical necessity, that is, an absolute quality of truth or anything else. But 
it overtly does lead them to rely on objectivity as an "epistemic" or de dicto 
necessity, that is, a necessity for the way they talk about truth (Hamlyn 79). 
Such apparent essentialist objectivity not only limits their arguments but also 
is an unethical practice in the public and private experience oftruth-seeking 
as I shall demonstrate in my closing remarks. 
Fundamental Temporalism 
The third way in which Neel and Herrnstein Smith err in their discussion of 
truth, value, and writing, is in their interpretation of human activity as 
fundamentally cyclic over time. This belief goes beyond the imperative of 
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historicism which limits the future to events prefigured by a past to suggest 
that time itself has no forward direction, no aspect that marks events as 
progressive. Without a conception of human experience as marking progress 
over time, both theorists must reject the conclusion that events may occur 
that define human activity as purposefully progressing toward an under-
standing of truth. 
The textual examples I have cited earlier confirm that Neel defines truth-
seeking as the historically determined endless task of replacing a supplement 
with a supplement, never reaching the truth. This view of truth-seeking is 
similar to Herrnstein Smith's tale of the endless balancing of accounts. 
Movement from one account to another is motivated only by what's better or 
worse in a given situation; the sands of value shift as needed to maintain her 
desert ecosystem of exchange. Both theorists have assumed not only that 
human activity is historically determined, but also that it fundamentally lacks 
direction over time. Their way of looking at time, truth, and events is 
consistent with ancient metaphors of time and destiny that have both 
dominated and constrained scientific explanations of natural events. As 
Stephen Jay Gould asserts, time traditionally has been conceptualized in 
terms of two controlling metaphors, the "arrow" and the "cycle": 
At one end of the dichotomy-I shall call it time's arrow-history is an irreversible 
sequence of unrepeatable events. Each moment occupies its own distinct position in a 
temporal series, and all moments, considered in proper sequence, tell a story of linked 
events moving in a direction. 
At the other end-I shall call it time's cycle-events have no meaning as distinct 
episodes with causal impact on a contingent history. Fundamental states are immanent 
in time, always present and never changing. Apparent motions are parts of repeating 
cycles, and differences of the past, will be realities of the future. Time has no direction. 
(10-11 ) 
Employing both the temporal metaphors of the arrow and cycle to describe 
a single ceaseless dynamic, Gould notes, can help one explain and interpret 
the world as a system progressing toward an end while maintaining a singular 
identity. But kept ever separate, these metaphors can prevent one from 
interpreting change as growth (blind to time's arrow) and from interpreting 
pattern as evidence of immanent identity (blind to time's cycle). Through 
examining the writings of early geologists, Gould demonstrates how belief in 
the ancient metaphor of time's cycle led them to interpret the earth as a 
machine which regenerates itself, despite the lack of empirical support for 
this notion; this theory was confirmed empirically at a much later date. 
However, he shows further tha t this same belief in the cyclic na ture of even ts 
over time led scientists to reject the possibility of unexpected catastrophic 
events changing the direction of earth's geologic development, a theory 
confirmed in later investigations. 
Neel and Herrnstein Smith make the same error in discounting the 
complementary conceptions of cyclic and directional time as did the early 
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geologists cited by Gould. Both interpret events over time as an endless cycle 
of exchanging supplement for supplement, good for good, truth for value, 
and writing for truth, without possibility of intervention, catastrophic or 
otherwise. They deny the possibility of directional change, maintaining that 
human behavior will continue to reflect the same cycle of searching for truth, 
yet getting nowhere. At best, men will be able to determine what is better or 
worse at a given time, which is what they have always been able to do and will 
do endlessly. The possibility of directional progress is absent in both 
theorists' world views; hence, they fail to interpret the cycles they have 
inscribed as having a purpose. For both, the endless activity they project has 
no goal, but rather results in infinite diversity and plurality of purpose and 
value. Consequently, it matters not whether relative truth A prevails over 
relative truth B because the truth is fundamentally determined by the cyclic 
event of one argument appearing more persuasive than another in a given 
circumstance. The possibility of people behaving differently than this 
pattern suggests is unthinkable because it is unthinkable either that events 
may occur over time which would move them to behave otherwise, or that 
they themselves can control directional progress. This interpretation of 
human existence suggests there is no ultimate purpose to the public and 
private experience of truth-seeking, a perspective that dismisses human 
agency as a factor directing and enabling social change for the common good, 
as I will show in the next section. As Gould concludes his tale of geologists' 
struggles to interpret earth's past, we modern scientists have been "com-
pelled to balance [this] dichotomy-because time's arrow and time's cycle 
both capture important aspects of reality" (178). It is not the limitations of 
either metaphor for time which prevent us from understanding reality, but 
rather our failure to use these metaphors interactively to generate a vision of 
the earth and our life that accounts for human progress. Here is where 
relativism misses the mark. 
The Truth about Writing and Truth 
Jasper Neel and Barbara Herrnstein Smith do not find truth in writing 
because they do not regard truth as in tegral wi th human experience. As I have 
proposed, three rational assumptions deny the relationship. Ideological 
historicism rejects the malleability of the future and denies the possibility of 
human agency that both embraces and overcomes the past. Hence, truth 
which has not yet been found is seen as unattainable in human experience 
and, thus, in writing. Essentialist objectivity makes oftruth an exchangeable, 
displaceable, replaceable object; it encourages the belief that observable and 
discrete differences in individuals' values deny the possibility of a truth held 
in common. Such a view of truth limits human discourse to continuous 
position-taking, where belief in something now pre-supposes the replace-
ment of a former belief ad infinitum, with no replacement ever having a claim 
to truth and no hope of a truth encompassing all human activity. Fundamen-
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tal temporalism denies the possibility that human activity is evolutionary, 
developmental, and progressive. It interprets the pattern of exchange of 
value for truth as perpetual and purposeless, unable to move in a direction. 
If human activity is directionless, then seeking the truth through writing is 
essentially purposeless and merely substitutes change for progress, as one 
discourse continually replaces another through besting an other. The hope 
of bettering all through learning from the past and shaping the future is 
absent in a world where progress has no meaning. To transcend the 
theoretical limits of the relativist philosophy of truth represented in the 
arguments ofthese scholars, we must recognize truth as integral with human 
experience and hence potentially expressed through all human concourse, 
and, thus, writing. 
Ifwe resist relativism in the process of producing and evaluating written 
discourse, we can restore the possibility of seeking truth through writing. 
Resistance to relativism involves rejecting strong discourse, that method of 
resolving difference through conflict and conquering. This is not an easy 
task, as the rhetorical tradition ofagonism underlies the way we teach writing 
and the way we have conceived of truth being found. (Indeed, it is so insidious 
that, at present, discourse in writing often is not heard except through that 
convention!) It is not possible to outline here a complete program for 
coming to truth through writing without agonism. But I shall explore briefly 
some possibilities that are open to us if we resist relativism and its champion 
agonistic rhetoric. 
Ifwe resist relativism, we can revise our notion of the competent author, 
and consequently, the competent seeker of truth. Rather than viewing 
neophyte or inept writers as unable to participate in public discourse without 
disassociating themselves from the social, economic, religious, and familial 
patterns that limit their written expression, we might view them as participat-
ing with us in a common endeavor to seek the truth. In this scenario, we as 
teachers elect to overcome the limitations of our pasts which urge us to 
conceive of student writing as a flawed representation of reality instead of a 
genuine struggle toward truth. Rather than assuming that our responsibility 
and, in fact, only choice is to teach students to communicate in the discourse 
genres that have confirmed value in academe and the business professions, 
we might examine how the ways they speak and write to us might shape the 
way we write to others in both public and academic forums. And further, 
rather than believing that only writers who produce a good argument which 
stands up to scrutiny can articulate the public truth, we might believe that 
good rhetoricians provide but one service in our collaborative struggle 
toward truth through a variety of human enterprises. This, interestingly, is 
the aim Neel wishes to achieve in advocating strong discourse-a "collabo-
rative [classroom atmosphere] where the teacher plays the role of philoso-
pher-king less and less and the role of discourse facilitator more and more" 
(210). But his vision of a plurality of competing discourses in the classroom 
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does not go far enough. It surely validates competitive vying for public 
validation. But absent is recognition of discourse that does not meet this 
ideal and acknowledgement that such discourse also participates in the 
ongoing conversation which moves us together toward truth. 
But to conceive of all discourse as participating in our mutual growth 
toward truth, it is necessary to wrest from relativism our conception of truth 
itself. Neither present as an absolute object nor embodied within a subject, 
truth-we must find-is born of human interaction, the struggle to know and 
understand one another and our environment, and the effort to better this 
world which we make and makes us. Truth made live in human interaction 
finds no victory in declaring an argument false, or its author a liar. Nor does 
it deem necessary that we seek the final word, for such a concept is meaning-
less in the continual process of human discourse. At the same time, to 
conceive of truth as born of in teraction is not to view tru th -seeking as the act 
of floundering in a void without seams or structure. Our lives are not 
seamless, nor endless; they are shaped by our friends, relatives, schools, 
churches, homes, and nations, and their meaning is reflected in our decisions 
and actions. The truth we seek through such interaction with others is subject 
to memory and learning and opens us to the possibility of a better life. 
Interestingly, Herrnstein Smith validates the role of prior experience in 
determining human activity and even the individual's role in using that 
experience to determine a course of action. She interprets societal and 
individual practices as initiating in "the recurrent inclinations" of individual 
agents themselves (162). Individuals' consistent "inclinations" to behave in 
one way rather than another, she claims, "are the corporeally inscribed traces 
of the differential consequences of their own prior and ongoing actions and 
interactions" (162). But she, like Neel, does not confirm that common 
purpose is engendered through such interaction. She chooses not to inter-
pret action that moves beyond individual experience as evidence of a human 
desire to achieve common understanding of our collective and personal 
worth. And what implications has this latter perspective for how we write? 
To seek truth in the process of interaction is to view writing not only as an act 
of art or rhetoric, but also as an act of faith that this occasion for authoring, 
reading, discussing, and evaluating will bring us to a better understanding of 
who we are, what we want, and where we are going. The poem or novel then 
becomes not the word that hopes to change us, but the scene for change 
through us. The business report recommends not the ultimate plan, but the 
place where we can begin planning. Such a perspective requires us to view 
rhetoric and hence persuasion in a new way, one that conceives of its aim not 
to create discourse that stands up to public scrutiny, but rather to create 
discourse that inspires public action for the common good. 
And finally, if we resist relativism, we can become engaged without 
apology in the act of trusting human enterprise. We can trust that we need 
not accept the pattern oflife as it has been lived as the pattern that determines 
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our future. We can question whether systems we have in place to ensure 
competing truths must continue to function to do so. We can claim finally 
that life itself has some purpose and that it is what we hold in common-our 
common aspira tions-tha t gives h umani ty expression. We can decide finally 
that writing (like all of our discourse) is provisional, marking a path toward 
the goals of our various enterprises and contributing to our common human-
ity, rather than bringing conversation to a halt in a final word that becomes 
a final deed. And we can begin judging the written work of our students as 
it aspires to be part of that conversation toward truth, rather than as it aspires 
to win an argument. 
Should we resist relativism, can we bring an end to the agonism that 
characterizes public discourse on issues of importance to us all? Rather than 
denying that possibility by pointing to the record of our past, we might hope 
for change through imagining the consequences of denying agonistic rhetoric 
in the future. We can project a process of involving individuals ina collective 
public discourse that would avoid, for instance, the sorry display of agonistic 
speech we witnessed in the televised senate hearings surrounding the nomi-
nation of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court. Here, instead of a 
meaningful quest for truth through human interaction, we witnessed a 
display of competitive rhetoric. Could these proceedings have been different 
if the truth to be found in human discourse and rhetoric was conceived of as 
undetermined by historical constraint, unlimited to a single word or phrase, 
and free to grow in the progress of human interaction? Could they have been 
different if we did not assume that the truth of any speaker's words was but 
relative to those nominal "facts" thought to be more persuasive? Could 
anyone justifiably have accused either Professor Hill or Judge Thomas of 
fabrication, thus categorically denying their personal differences through 
declaring one's truth the victor? Could anyone justifiably have declared that 
Professor Hill's remarks were delusional or hysterical, restricting her free-
dom to speak and think differently? Could anyone in good conscience have 
dismissed Judge Thomas's nomination as social tokenism, thus denying his 
contribution to the interchange that marks our collective attention to and 
understanding of societal diversity in these times? What difference would it 
have made if the Thomas-Hill debate was not a debate, but rather a true 
hearing, received with full attention in the hope not of declaring a winner or 
loser, but rather of exercising personal freedom, engaging in conversation 
about our differences, and determining a direction for a continued quest for 
truth through ongoing interaction? And how could a change in discourse 
practices have achieved that end? 
The change required, I believe, is to dismiss concern about speaking and 
writing the truth and to begin speaking and writing in truth. To do so is to 
assume a responsibility for discourse that goes beyond rhetorical relativism. 
It is to treat rhetoric not simply as a tool for persuasion and critique, but as 
the purpose of human enterprise, and, as such, reflective of our moral intent. 
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To describe writing as it embodies human intent for the common good is the 
challenge a rhetorical theory must address if it is to explain the truth of 
discourse to ourselves. 
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Kinneavy Award Winners Announced 
The James L. Kinneavy Award for the most outstanding essay in volume 11 
ofJAC was awarded to Patricia A Sullivan for "Writing in the Graduate 
Curriculum: Literary Criticism as Composition." Professor Sullivan 
received a cash award and a framed citation. 
Joseph Petraglia received an honorable mention for "Interrupting the 
Conversation: The Constructionist Dialogue in Composition" and also 
received a framed citation. 
The award is generously endowed by Professor Kinneavy, Blumberg 
Centennial Professor at the University of Texas, and was presented by him 
at the meeting of the Association of Teachers of Advanced Composition 
at the CCCC Connvention in Cincinnati. 
